Friday, 4 February 2011
David Harris on Sierra Leone and Liberia: Relevance to Sudan?
In the meantime, I wanted to share a few notes and comments about David Harris’ seminar last Wednesday on ‘Unfolding Consequences of Liberalism in Sierra Leone and Liberia: Liberal Justice and state-building at work” at the Centre of African Studies centre here in Edinburgh. Many of his points relate to developments in Sudan, so I thought I would briefly share.
His paper can be broken into two parts. The first was about formats of justice when dealing with post-conflict societies. He discussed the Sierra Leone Special Court (SLSC) in 2003. It has indicted 13 people, of whom: 3 have died, 1 has gone missing, 8 have been convicted and 1 is currently on trial (Charles Taylor). He believed that Sierra Leone was a special case, as the RUF had militarily collapsed and so the SLSC was able to operate in a political vacuum. He contrasted this situation with Liberia in 2003. Here, the rebels were still active and so it was impossible to hold trials. Those involved in war crimes were required for political bargaining. As part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (another CPA!), a Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) was established along with a two-year transitional government. As part of the agreement, no official operating in the transitional government could then run for government. Due to these stipulations, Harris believed that the election was an amazingly open civilian election.
Then Harris moved on to talk about trials more generally. He believed that 2000 was a kind of watershed. Before this time, there was a general acceptance of the necessity of political bargaining but after 2000, there was a shift towards criminal trials. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in 2006. Harris pointed out that, so far, every person indicted by the ICC has been an African (despite the evidence of war crimes in the Middle East by both Western and regional governments). Harris mentioned the political effects that these trials have had on the countries affected, in particular how the ICC has threatened peace prospects in Uganda and Sudan. In the case of Sudan, this point has been well documented in Mamdani’s controversial work, Survivors and Saviours and has been discussed and debated on Alex de Waal’s excellent blog, Making Sense of Sudan, especially in discussions about the Save Darfur movement and the ICC.
More generally, Harris discussed how there have been three shifts:
From bargaining to criminalisation
From the targeting of structures to individuals
The Delegitimization of violence.
Interestingly, on the last point, Harris wondered if this was something the international community really wanted to take on. He reminded us that the ANC in South Africa used violence as part of their struggle against the Apartheid regime. He asked: Is violence always unjustified? In some ways, events in Southern Sudan also question this trend, as SPLM used violence in order to break away from the North. It would be difficult to convince the Southern Sudanese that this violence was unjustified given the history between the North and South. Although many have pointed to the authoritarian and often violent nature of the SPLM leadership as a potential barrier to sustainable state-building in the new South Sudan.
There is a PhD student at the University of Khartoum who is doing research on the TRC in South Africa and its applicability to the Sudanese case. I look forward to her research, as I believe it is very important, but I also urge her to look at other cases besides South Africa. As Harris rightly points out that each case is different, depending on the status of the political and military parties involved. South Africa is largely seen as a success, but what about Sierra Leone and Liberia?
Harris questioned the idea that Liberal Justice has ever been successful when imposed from outside and asked whether other formats of justice are more appropriate. How do people see war crimes trial? Are people ambivalent about it? Do they want to open old wounds? Can TRCs deliver reconciliation even if they do not offer truth?
The second part of his seminar focused on state-building in Sierra Leone since 2003. Operating under a Post-Washington Consensus (that is, re-building the state in a neo-liberal framework) DfID, under the New Labour government, has been very active in the process, making a ten year promise to collaborate with the Sierra Leonean government. Harris presented his research on the perceived successes and failures from the point of view of the stakeholders involved. There were a number of interesting points, which reflect many similarities with the situation in Sudan.
First of all, Harris described a wide divergence of opinions, with the most optimistic being highly supportive of decentralisation and public sector reform, to those who were highly critical, citing the presence of donors as a major source of corruption. The main weakness highlighted by Harris’ respondents was the incapacity of public sector staff. When he asked respondents how long they expected donors to stay in Sierra Leone, the answers were “10 years”, “20 years”, “a generation” and “forever”.
When describing successes, he made a very interesting point. Specific successes were due to key individuals who were able to drive through reform. He listed the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance as ‘success stories’ and in each case, there was a core group of people- maybe 5- who were able to mobilize the rest of their departments. These individuals were either Sierra Leoneans from the Diaspora or internationals seconded to the government. The president himself was described as a ‘lighthouse’- when he shines his light on a problem area, things improve but when his light moves on, there is only hope that reform will stay (beautiful imagery). One donor staff member described his role as ‘managing the lighthouse’.
This was very similar to the impression I formed in Sudan. Whenever there was reform or success, it was always due to key individuals, highly ambitious and highly competent, working very hard to make change. It is important to note that these were not all ex-pat Sudanese or foreigners- often they were Sudanese who were simply very determined. In most cases, however, it seems that these individuals would also have access to political capital- they were in some way, connected to the regime, if not directly, then through an intermediary.
Harris mentioned the ‘Drivers of Change’ research, funded by DfID in Liberia and other countries in 2003. This research has now been replicated across the world, including Sudan. One of its recommendations was to identify key individuals or groups- women, youth or other ‘drivers’- who should be targeted by external agents to make change. The only problem with this approach is that it is not always sustainable. When one individual leaves (or is removed), then progress falters. I can cite numerous examples of this phenomenon in Sudan. In particular, diaspora workers can often suffer from ‘burn-out’. Relocating oneself to a country struggling to develop is a lot to ask from young professionals who have grown accustomed operating in commercially or highly institutionalized environments overseas- especially when they have spent their entire education abroad as well.
In this way, I feel that, rather than focusing on diaspora workers, drivers of change must also include Sudanese from Sudan or Sierra Leoneans from Sierra Leone, who have more at stake in the success of reforms. They are there to stay! One member of the audience asked Harris about the relationship between the diaspora workers and the local staff- whether there was resentment about salaries or differences of opinion- this was a question Harris didn’t really have a good answer. I feel that this is a very important question and one that needs more research. From my own research on work environments in Sudan, there is often a lot of conflict between local and expat workers, and ESPECIALLY between expat Sudanese and local Sudanese. Some local Sudanese in international organisations like the UN or international businesses complained of a bias against them, because of their inability to communicate fluently in English. British and American educated Sudanese were often given more opportunities to speak in meetings and had more access to international staff. While these people are often key in moving reform, local drivers should not be overlooked. Lighthouses are all very well, but donors must also look into the darkness for partners and ‘drivers for change’.
Lastly, David Harris replied to my post and wanted to say that his my book will be coming out shortly with IB Tauris, called Civil War and Democracy in West Africa: Conflict Resolution, Elections and Justice in Sierra Leone and Liberia.
Sunday, 8 August 2010
To the person who vandalised Dr. Siddiq Umbadda’s excellent paper on Education and Mismanagement of Sudanese Economy and Society (1954-1989)…
You have terrible grammar.
I am reading this great (and quite poetically written) Development Studies and Research Centre paper (no. 83) from October 1990 and I’m starting to yell at the page. It’s not the information. It’s not the arguments, which are clever and making me re-consider how much wasta there was in the early days of Sudanese economic development (More generally, I am starting to re-think some of my arguments in light of all these old papers I have been reading this week). No, it is not Dr. Umbadda’s scholarship at all!
No, it’s all these annoying comments and ‘corrections’ that some young whippersnapper has felt the need to leave in his wake. What is most irritating is that most of his grammatical corrections are wrong! Now, I am NO grammar guru and I frequently roll over syntax rules with aplomb, but if you are going to go through a distinguished professor’s work and ‘correct’ his mistakes, have a little care… and if you are going to do so, don’t write ‘stupid’ in the margins when he is making a good point.
I don’t know you are, but HARAM on you!
As these papers are only available in paper form and only available after careful adventures in the University of Khartoum libraries, people should NOT feel the need to tamper with the texts!
OK, I obviously need to get out of the office and go home. Sunday grumpiness coming out.
One day, I will find you Development Studies and Research Centre vandal! One day!
Friday, 6 August 2010
Back to the... Future: Sudan in a 1990 Postscript

I was seven in 1989. I knew nothing of
This morning I have been re-reading Mansour Khalid’s book “The Government They Deserve” and the post-script is fascinating. Published in 1990, the author had just finished his book on the political elite of the country and had not expected what was to come: namely the coup of 1989 and the coming of the NIF. In Khalid’s postscript, you can really see the intense frustration with the ‘democratic’ government of Sadiq al Mahdi. People did not know what to expect from the Brigadier Bashir in those early days. Bearing in mind that Mansour Khalid was a bit of a political outsider and so his critique of Sadiq’s government is partly ideological and personal, it is nevertheless a fascinating look at the political climate at that time. Here is a (long) excerpt from the 1990 postscript:
“The future of the new government is as yet uncertain, but it will certainly have to face a number of grave problems. The coup has opened up as many questions as it supposedly answered. Foremost amongst there will be the transition back to civilian rule; an issue that was simply disregarded by the junta in their initial declarations. It is clearly not too soon to be thinking in these terms, if the lessons of the past have been learned at all, then it will have been noted by the new military regime that former Sudanese military and quasi-military governments have equally had their problems, and that engineering a satisfactory transfer of power to civil authorities has been a bugbear of all such governments. Those such as Abboud’s or Nimeiri’s, which hung on to power for too long, were eventually toppled overnight amidst popular jubilation.
What makes the present situation worse is the total administrative bankruptcy and the exhaustion of many of the institutions and organs of civil government. Worn out by corruption and disillusioned with the pathetic posturing of recent years, the people who might take the leading role in the future of civil governments, according to the new leader, had to persuaded to assume such responsibility. The 21-man strong civilian cabinet, announced on 9 Jule by General Bashir, reveals that the General was not persuasive enough. Trade Unionists and many senior civil servants who were approached to join the government refused, though a good number of them may have heaved a sigh of relief when Sadiq was removed. Incongruously while disillusionment with Sadiq’s government was universal, representatives of popular organizations continued to persuade themselves that the Sadiq-led democracy was there to stay as if all lewd and indecorous methods in which sectarian party politics were exercised were of no relevance to the way the governed judged their government.
To no-one’s surprise, therefore, the dissolution of parties and trade unions was the first step taken by the military. What follows, however, is harder to analyse. As like as not, the military may be tempted to cut corners and establish a one-party system notwithstanding the fiascos of similar top-down political organizations in the region including the Sudanese experience of the SSU. They, like some of their ilk, may also consider installing a so-called guided democracy or be wise enough to carefully prepare the ground for a return to genuine democracy in the light General Obasanjo and General Babangida in
Although it has little to do with Education, the current chapter of my thesis (which makes this diversion naughty), I found this postscript so interesting and helpful in understanding the 2010 election. In my discussions with voters, I was repeatedly told that Bashir is not as bad as what came before. I had always dismissed these sentiments, arguing that you cannot compare a three year term with a twenty year term. But maybe I am too hard on these voters. I was not around in the late eighties. Maybe the kind of frustration that Mansour Khalid writes about in this book were very strongly felt, maybe those memories cannot be dismissed offhand.
I believe the weight of history has clouded the way outsiders see this regime. We tend to imagine that the imprisonment of Turabi was a well recognized cover-up perceived by the Sudanese public at large and we perhaps romanticise the democratic period that preceded it, but re-reading literature from that period removes this weight of history. Things are a lot more complicated than we imagine, as we jump without the benefit of memories of our own. We have to take in account the late 80s if we want to understand the present period, and/or the future.
Saturday, 10 April 2010
The Paper Mill War: Elections Posters in Khartoum
Khartoum's streets are lined with the flickering faces of smiling men whose smiles have now been ripped and bruised. Before everyone pulled out, this election was being fought at the photocopiers. It was a visual fight, a papery race to the ballot. These are just some of the faces inhabiting the walls and streets of Khartoum this month...

















What we should learn from this election.
"HEY HEY HEY!"
"Stop the car, there is a khawajia chasing us!"
"Why stop the car if she's after us? She looks mean!"
"Just stop the freaking car!"
The car stops.
Breathless, the words surface in my mouth, salty dry words that have been baked to a crisp by the chase.
"I.... want.... a.... poster."
"You want a poster?"
"Naam!"
"An Omar Bashir poster?"
Eyes roll up and down like extremely dubious yo-yos. Clearly I am not your typical NCP customer, but then who isn't these days? Even the mother of my Coptic landlady seems to love the cha cha man. "He good" she says to me, "strong!"
I try to get into character, "Yes, I want an Omar Bashir poster!" I forcibly silence the reason in my brain to spit out the words, "I have chased you down half of Africa Road, haven't I?"
"You like Bashir?" Narrowed faces almost poking at me. The reason's getting rowdy. Pipe down, I command! My eyes twitch. "A big time fan?"
"More or less", I concede, not explaining less is the operative word.
"Very well then."
They hand them over.
Alhamdulilah!
I have been collecting campaign posters from speeding vehicles, snapping inconspicuously at the road side and doing my damn well best to acquire political items of clothing- it began with a rather convincing Salva Kir hat, then an Umma waistcoast, now a beautiful SPLM t-shirt. But it's all a little sobering. I have done all of this for a non-election.
Last Sunday I went to the Rashid Diab arts centre to listen to a seminar about the elections. One of the speakers urged the foreign monitors to accept this election, unlike he said, Iran and Palestine. He got lots of cheers. A real crowd pleaser. But it's kind of hard to accept an election that none of the other parties accept (or didn't accept before they were bribed... but that is just a rumour!)
For those unfamiliar with Sudan's current election, it's important to think of it as a gift. A gift of legitimacy from the opposition parties to the ruling regime. He is clearly going to win the thing. He has all the state's resources to use at his disposal. He has twenty years of power under his belt, systematically destroying all opposition, kicking out and silencing intellectuals and monopolizing the media. He is also credited for bringing peace to the South, oil from the ground and stability to the country as a whole. Elections are in his interest. A gift. A democratic crown (probably made by Chinese workers)!
The gift is part of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the North and the South, and as such, it comes with strings. Some of these strings are public: when it comes to the election- an abrogation of the emergency laws, an independent election commission, limitations on campaign spending and widening of press freedoms. There are also lots of rumors about backroom dealing: hidden strings. It seems a little puzzling that the opposition parties waited until one week before the elections to announce their boycotts. You have to speculate that they have been negotiating with the ruling party: we will take part in this "show" if you meet our demands. Some say that the SPLM and the other parties had an agreement to cooperate with one another and when the SPLM pulled out (possibly by request from the NCP in return for a smooth referendum next year) the others withdrew angrily. Did the NCP manipulate the Juba Alliance in order to bring about this collapse? Did they underestimate the other parties' tenacity? The latest rumour is that the DUP has been paid millions of pounds to re-enter the election (certainly their posters have shot up dramatically these past couple days). Whether this offer was also extended to the Umma party, we can only speculate. Was the bribe not big enough? Did they resist on the basis of principles or do they have other tricks up their sleeves?
At first I was really angry at the other parties. Regimes aren't removed overnight. They take multiple elections. They take dilution. They take time. Whatever his image in the Western media, Omar Bashir is an extremely popular man- especially in Khartoum. And the other parties can't expect anything else. For me, this election was the first step of many. Of course the NCP was going to win, but the idea was to get people going.
From a Khartoum perspective, Sudan is booming. Roads are being built, parks and public spaces are being transformed, development projects have been jump-started all over the place over the past year (some say as a form of election campaign). And most importantly, people are scared of change. This is not surprising. Omar Bashir is all about stability. The last democratic period in Sudan was a time of great economic crisis, shortages in basic supplies, war and mass exodus of Sudanese professionals and experts abroad. Most of the people I have asked about the elections believe that Sadiq ElMahdi and his democracy failed to pull Sudan out of trouble. Whether it is fair to compare a three year term with a twenty year term is beside the point. Better the devil you know than the devil you don't.
What this election has really drummed into me is the idea that democracy does not begin and end with elections. Democracy is about a relationship between a state and its people. This is something Justin Willis spoke about in his lecture on the history of Sudanese elections last year. I wish the opposition parties had listened. For a real democracy to blossom, there has to be expectations. Demands! Promises extended and votes as contracts! Democracy is not supposed to be about loyalty, about charisma per se, but about interests, policies, development. This is not the situation in Sudan and has not been the case in past elections. Probably the most surprising thing about Omar Bashir's success is his popularity among those hardluck souls who don't have any wasta. The other week I met a taxi drivers with a PhD in Engineering who said he will still vote for Bashir. When I ask, "Why? You have a PhD and you're driving a taxi! Clearly not a good economy, not a good system!" He explained that he is better than the others. "They don't want change, they just want power." There are SO many people like this. Maybe they don't all have PhDs, but a vast number of the unemployed and semi-employed are university graduates who are dissatisfied with the labour market. If you can't convince these people to vote for you, then you aren't trying hard enough. It's really that simple.
This sentiment was echoed by a University of Khartoum professor, Atta El Battahani. He mused that perhaps the only party that really wants to change the system is the SPLM. The others just want to take over what the NCP has built. Many Northerners feel that the SPLM is a party of the South. After the referendum, they will be irrelevant and it would be foolish to squander your vote on a party that will soon be gone. When I went to the SPLM offices this week to interview someone about government employment, I was surprised about the number of Northerners in the office. It was kind of lovely: a snapshot of a new Sudan, Southerners and Northerners drinking tea together beneath a line of framed photographers of the late John Garang. Mash'allah! But without the philosopher-king, the SPLM doesn't seem to garner wide scale support in the North.
I have a lot of sympathy for the other parties. They are up against a mountain but at the same time, they could have done better. They could have made this election about issues, about the economy, about education, about jobs! There are so many frustrations simmering. They have really wasted an amazing opportunity to change the language of democracy away from loyalty and towards a discussion of the reality on the ground. There is so much opportunity in this country- oil, agriculture, universities galore and many of its problems (like the mismatch between education and employment) are due to terrible mismanagement, an amazing lack of coordination among government ministries and a complete lack of responsibility on the part of officials. I was completely stunned when the Minister of Labour told me it was not his responsibility to look at the career prospects of Sudanese graduates- that was the job of the Ministry of Higher Education. This government could be doing so much MUCH better- even leaving aside any discussion of Darfur. I have been saying all along that I don't really care which party wins, as long as they raise the expectations of the population, as long as they make government accountable. That is what democracy should bring: accountability. That is the whole bloody point, isn't it?
Instead it seems this election has brought the opposite: legitimacy without justification and we are all to blame. Obviously the NCP is to blame. They have manipulated the election and undermined the unity of the other parties. The other parties failed to change the language of democracy and make the "wasta-less" realize that change is possible. Of course they are scared, but people can be made to be brave! The international community is to blame for pushing and pushing without remembering the true purpose to begin with: to bring accountability. Those who understand Sudanese politics best- and I believe Atta and Justin are among them- have been recommending for this election to be postponed for months. It was clear that the country was not ready.
I hope that we all learn from this experience for next time and I do believe there will be a next time. Voter education should not just be about the mechanics of choosing, but about making demands and searching for solutions. A campaign should be a time of great discussion, a focus on national problems and a cacophony of suggestions. The international community is so obsessed with the mechanics of elections: the ballot papers, the finance, the posters, the journalists, the monitoring, but what about the issues? What about that relationship between people and candidate? How can we re-formulate interventions and programs that seek to promote democracy towards accountability? That is the lesson we should learn from this election, I believe.
I am still happy there will be an election. For one of my best friends here, this will be the first time he has ever participated in an election. It should be a time of celebration. In some ways, he is lucky. He wants to vote for an independent. He can still mark his "x" where he chooses. It is a fine thing to vote and we need to celebrate!
We shall see what the week ahead brings. What kind of celebrations are in order.
Friday, 26 March 2010
Action Research: the responsibility behind change.
Paul Fean gave a beautiful presentation to the seminar series last week in which he again confirmed how ingenious and simple Action Research can be.
Action Research, if you are unaware, is practitioner focused research that encourages practitioners to identify problems, introduce innovations and then track the progress of those innovation over time. The whole process is seen as a cycle, innovations continually change the system and new learning comes out of each new round. Importantly, practitioners must choose a problem that they have the power to change.
In Paul Fean's case, he works with teachers and headmasters. They identify problems in schools and try to develop new innovative ways of dealing with these problems. There is also a collaborative aspect, the teachers come together and share their experiences- maybe an innovation that works well in one school can be replicated in another. He did his doctoral research with teachers in adult education centres in Omdurman and then more recently, he worked with the Sudanese Ministry of Education working with 50 headmasters from across Sudan.
The really great thing about Action Research is that it forces stakeholders to take responsibility over their field. Sudanese will often complain that there is no "system" to things in Sudan. There is no support from above, no recognition by the state and little funding available for change. While this environment is not wholly conducive to change, there are exceptions. I have interviewed some pretty inspiring people who have made change through heart battering personal perseverance.
One of the things I want to address in my PhD is the idea of change comes to pass in Sudan. My examples come from professional associations. When there is no "system" (in the sense of an explicit structure), how do individuals cope and create space for change? How can their personal efforts become models for others to use? And ideally, how can the state learn from these models to implement large scale change?
Action Research has this potential.
In the discussion session after his presentation we got into the discussion of whether Action Research is more about "treating symptoms, than treating the root causes". We heard about how some primary school classes have more than 100 students. Can you imagine teaching 100 seven year olds?! If the methods of teaching and the materials originate in countries where class sizes are in their twenties and thirties, you begin to understand the uphill battle to teach in Sudan. If you
add on to this the fact that 9 out of 10 teachers are not properly trained, then the problem gets even more serious.
Quite a few of my interviewees said they started their careers as teachers- this was back in the 70s- when teachers got good salaries and a certain amount of prestige and respect. These early teachers went on to become captains of industry. Now, teaching salaries are meager and most teachers have to work as private tutors to make ends meet. It is no surprise that teachers struggle and have little time to think about innovations in their classrooms. They believe they do not have the power and control over the problems that they face. 100 students in one class? What do you want me to do?!
And quite right too!
Some of these problems do require action at the top- more funding, better teaching training, smaller class sizes, more appropriate teaching materials and methods. But still, there is room for change. Some of the Action Research teachers involved in Paul's project chose the topic "How to develop better teaching methods for huge class sizes." This is the kind of research we need in this context!
Action research begs the question: in the absence of change from above, what can be changed on the ground? And who knows- maybe one individual can prove through success that things can work. Their hard work can get scaled up. I think there are examples of this in the world of professional associations (but give me time to write this part of my PhD up!).
The other big insight that I got from Paul's presentation is the importance of legitimacy. Participants in these projects were part of a bigger endeavor, especially in the case of the head-teachers, they had the backing of the Ministry of Education. They had a "foreign expert" training them in a new research methodology called "Action Research". It gave them the support and encouragement to believe that change was possible.
When you listen to Paul Fean speak about Action Research, it is difficult to resist imagining other Action Research applications:
How can businesses use Action Research to deal with wasta?
How can students use Action Research to deal with unemployment in their area?
How can universities use Action Research to encourage wider collaboration among academics?
Action Research gets people to take responsibility for change. Yes, there is something I can do about this and this is how I am going to do it! Maybe it is just a fancy name for things that people should already be doing, but this sense of legitimacy and framework is important- here is a "system" of change that we can use.
There is one weakness to Action Research. If the innovations originate from the minds of practitioners working in the school environments in question, then the innovations might not always be the most radical. At the same time, their innovations will be more appropriate and contextually relevant, but not radical. It is preferable in this case, to mix practitioners from around the country and to share insights from abroad. Paul seemed to think that this might have been the case with some of his projects, that the change was not radical enough but he didn't want to interfere too much in the process. He was there to study the process itself. He talked about how he might try to play with this balance in the future: the balance between appropriateness of change and radicalness of innovation.
A friend recently posted a nice article on change management. It spoke of the need to look out for the drivers of change:
"An important insight from complexity science is that any effort to intentionally bring about development and change should be built on and link into supporting, self-reinforcing processes of endogenous change" (De Lange, 2010).
I feel like when it comes to Sudan, Action Research can play a big role in this innovating for change, bringing in these processes of endogenous change into a wider frame of action... so Shukran Paul Fean for your insights!
Thursday, 11 March 2010
My latest oasis in Khartoum
A GREAT new library in Khartoum
I thought I had been to the Development studies library. I thought wrong.
The Development Studies and Research Institute has opened a new library. There are now actually two: one downstairs (old school and dusty where I found a mysterious reference: "Proceedings of the Minister of Monosters") and one upstairs, a veritable oasis: new, cool (in terms of temperature!), hooked up to the internet and very well organized. They are still moving books and sorting things out but they have a great collection of UN and World Bank books- very up to date. They also have a lot of books about gender, especially in Sudan (you have to search through the dusty files for this, but there are some treasures!). I think they are slowly moving the books upstairs so their collection will probably increase over the next year.
It is also just a great place to study- very quiet and as I said, very cool! So if you are stranded in the heat of the city and need a place to study, go to the Development Studies library at the University of Khartoum. It is half way between the staff club (on Sharia Jamieat) and the bookstore on the other end. The head librarian is called Hussein and he is very helpful.











