Hello everyone!
I have been really bad at updating my blog over the summer, because I have been working hard to finish my thesis. It has paid off.
I have a new job at the Oxford Internet Institute starting in October. I will be working on a project looking at internet and economic development in Kenya and Rwanda. I am very excited about the project and promise to be a better blogger once this thesis is turned in!
http://www.zerogeography.net/2011/09/project-kick-off-promises-of-fibre.html
One month left inshallah. Wish me luck!
Laura
Friday, 2 September 2011
Monday, 4 July 2011
A thought about the marginality of African studies…
My good friend Paul Fean has always told me that in academic life, one must find one’s ‘tribe,’ that elusive group of scholars that will make one feel happiest and most inspired. As in other things, happiness isn’t just a matter of increasing one’s own individual utility but of being part of a community. This is very much how I live out my academic life. I cannot work without a tribe around.
I have been to quite a few different kinds of conferences over the duration of my PhD. As someone on the boundary of the ‘African’ and ‘Arab’ world and whose research concerns the nature of the ‘African state’, the utility and use of ‘social networks’ and the nature of communication and information structures, I have tried to find my tribe in many places. I have been to ‘Middle Eastern studies’, Sudan Studies, ‘Anthropology of Money’, ICT for Development, Microfinance, Education, Anthropology and this month, I finally went to an ‘African Studies conference: ECAS 4.
This was the best. I was on two panels, one on 'tribalism' and globalization/liberalization and one on ethnographic approaches to African states.
This was also the first time I had been to a conference with my department and it was also the first time I saw so many young ‘Sudan Studies’ people in one place (‘Sudan Studies’ conferences generally tend to include more senior academics)- but it was also the panels and the other papers from across Africa. I really ‘felt at home’ in ECAS.
To offer an example. When I attended WOCMES (World Congress on Middle Eastern Studies) last summer, I found almost no panels on corruption, statehood, unemployment, entrepreneurship/liberalization or even, politics. Whereas at ECAS (European Congress on African Studies), there were plenty of panels on corruption, statehood, entrepreneurship/employment- and lots and lots of papers on politics. How can two parts of the world produce such different research interests?
In some ways, I think this is partly due to sources of funding. While Africanists often complain that Africa is marginalized by academia and by the big disciplines like History, Sociology and to a lesser extent, Anthropology, I feel that this ‘marginality’ might actually be a source of strength for the discipline.
My biggest gripe with ‘Middle Eastern studies’ conferences has been the lack of political discussions (this will hopefully change now that the Tunisian and Egyptian youth have disturbed the obsession with religion, Israel and ‘culture’ as the dominant topics of the region). My biggest gripe with Development and especially, ICT/Microfinance conferences has been the fact that everyone really really wants mobile phones and microfinance to transform Africa. ICT4D also suffers from a bias that ICT is ‘measurable’ and therefore allows economists a renewed opportunity to look at economic growth in a numerical way. Other parts of the economy that are less ‘measurable’, are thereby not equally attractive to economists. There is therefore a strong sense of hopefulness behind much of this work that shields it from deeper discussions of political economy. You get the sense that the researchers need to show that their research is ‘helpful’ in order to secure further support and funding from mighty international organizations and governments.
Both of these ‘gripes’ are due to research funding. This has been made plainly clear over the past year. Show me the money Saudi Sheikhs and Libyan autocrats!
‘African studies’ as a discipline might be marginalized and it may not benefit from the patronage of rich state families but this marginality also provides a critical space within which scholars can study what they like.
I hope that Middle Eastern studies will change or perhaps the North African specialists would be wise to migrate and come join in more African studies arenas. We are ready to welcome you! We have been studying corruption, statehood and the effects of liberalization on politics for some time.
OK, now I must get back to finishing that draft!
I have been to quite a few different kinds of conferences over the duration of my PhD. As someone on the boundary of the ‘African’ and ‘Arab’ world and whose research concerns the nature of the ‘African state’, the utility and use of ‘social networks’ and the nature of communication and information structures, I have tried to find my tribe in many places. I have been to ‘Middle Eastern studies’, Sudan Studies, ‘Anthropology of Money’, ICT for Development, Microfinance, Education, Anthropology and this month, I finally went to an ‘African Studies conference: ECAS 4.
This was the best. I was on two panels, one on 'tribalism' and globalization/liberalization and one on ethnographic approaches to African states.
This was also the first time I had been to a conference with my department and it was also the first time I saw so many young ‘Sudan Studies’ people in one place (‘Sudan Studies’ conferences generally tend to include more senior academics)- but it was also the panels and the other papers from across Africa. I really ‘felt at home’ in ECAS.
To offer an example. When I attended WOCMES (World Congress on Middle Eastern Studies) last summer, I found almost no panels on corruption, statehood, unemployment, entrepreneurship/liberalization or even, politics. Whereas at ECAS (European Congress on African Studies), there were plenty of panels on corruption, statehood, entrepreneurship/employment- and lots and lots of papers on politics. How can two parts of the world produce such different research interests?
In some ways, I think this is partly due to sources of funding. While Africanists often complain that Africa is marginalized by academia and by the big disciplines like History, Sociology and to a lesser extent, Anthropology, I feel that this ‘marginality’ might actually be a source of strength for the discipline.
My biggest gripe with ‘Middle Eastern studies’ conferences has been the lack of political discussions (this will hopefully change now that the Tunisian and Egyptian youth have disturbed the obsession with religion, Israel and ‘culture’ as the dominant topics of the region). My biggest gripe with Development and especially, ICT/Microfinance conferences has been the fact that everyone really really wants mobile phones and microfinance to transform Africa. ICT4D also suffers from a bias that ICT is ‘measurable’ and therefore allows economists a renewed opportunity to look at economic growth in a numerical way. Other parts of the economy that are less ‘measurable’, are thereby not equally attractive to economists. There is therefore a strong sense of hopefulness behind much of this work that shields it from deeper discussions of political economy. You get the sense that the researchers need to show that their research is ‘helpful’ in order to secure further support and funding from mighty international organizations and governments.
Both of these ‘gripes’ are due to research funding. This has been made plainly clear over the past year. Show me the money Saudi Sheikhs and Libyan autocrats!
‘African studies’ as a discipline might be marginalized and it may not benefit from the patronage of rich state families but this marginality also provides a critical space within which scholars can study what they like.
I hope that Middle Eastern studies will change or perhaps the North African specialists would be wise to migrate and come join in more African studies arenas. We are ready to welcome you! We have been studying corruption, statehood and the effects of liberalization on politics for some time.
OK, now I must get back to finishing that draft!
Friday, 4 February 2011
David Harris on Sierra Leone and Liberia: Relevance to Sudan?
I am dying to write a post on Egypt but first I wait for Mubarak to leave…yaaaalllla!
In the meantime, I wanted to share a few notes and comments about David Harris’ seminar last Wednesday on ‘Unfolding Consequences of Liberalism in Sierra Leone and Liberia: Liberal Justice and state-building at work” at the Centre of African Studies centre here in Edinburgh. Many of his points relate to developments in Sudan, so I thought I would briefly share.
His paper can be broken into two parts. The first was about formats of justice when dealing with post-conflict societies. He discussed the Sierra Leone Special Court (SLSC) in 2003. It has indicted 13 people, of whom: 3 have died, 1 has gone missing, 8 have been convicted and 1 is currently on trial (Charles Taylor). He believed that Sierra Leone was a special case, as the RUF had militarily collapsed and so the SLSC was able to operate in a political vacuum. He contrasted this situation with Liberia in 2003. Here, the rebels were still active and so it was impossible to hold trials. Those involved in war crimes were required for political bargaining. As part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (another CPA!), a Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) was established along with a two-year transitional government. As part of the agreement, no official operating in the transitional government could then run for government. Due to these stipulations, Harris believed that the election was an amazingly open civilian election.
Then Harris moved on to talk about trials more generally. He believed that 2000 was a kind of watershed. Before this time, there was a general acceptance of the necessity of political bargaining but after 2000, there was a shift towards criminal trials. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in 2006. Harris pointed out that, so far, every person indicted by the ICC has been an African (despite the evidence of war crimes in the Middle East by both Western and regional governments). Harris mentioned the political effects that these trials have had on the countries affected, in particular how the ICC has threatened peace prospects in Uganda and Sudan. In the case of Sudan, this point has been well documented in Mamdani’s controversial work, Survivors and Saviours and has been discussed and debated on Alex de Waal’s excellent blog, Making Sense of Sudan, especially in discussions about the Save Darfur movement and the ICC.
More generally, Harris discussed how there have been three shifts:
From bargaining to criminalisation
From the targeting of structures to individuals
The Delegitimization of violence.
Interestingly, on the last point, Harris wondered if this was something the international community really wanted to take on. He reminded us that the ANC in South Africa used violence as part of their struggle against the Apartheid regime. He asked: Is violence always unjustified? In some ways, events in Southern Sudan also question this trend, as SPLM used violence in order to break away from the North. It would be difficult to convince the Southern Sudanese that this violence was unjustified given the history between the North and South. Although many have pointed to the authoritarian and often violent nature of the SPLM leadership as a potential barrier to sustainable state-building in the new South Sudan.
There is a PhD student at the University of Khartoum who is doing research on the TRC in South Africa and its applicability to the Sudanese case. I look forward to her research, as I believe it is very important, but I also urge her to look at other cases besides South Africa. As Harris rightly points out that each case is different, depending on the status of the political and military parties involved. South Africa is largely seen as a success, but what about Sierra Leone and Liberia?
Harris questioned the idea that Liberal Justice has ever been successful when imposed from outside and asked whether other formats of justice are more appropriate. How do people see war crimes trial? Are people ambivalent about it? Do they want to open old wounds? Can TRCs deliver reconciliation even if they do not offer truth?
The second part of his seminar focused on state-building in Sierra Leone since 2003. Operating under a Post-Washington Consensus (that is, re-building the state in a neo-liberal framework) DfID, under the New Labour government, has been very active in the process, making a ten year promise to collaborate with the Sierra Leonean government. Harris presented his research on the perceived successes and failures from the point of view of the stakeholders involved. There were a number of interesting points, which reflect many similarities with the situation in Sudan.
First of all, Harris described a wide divergence of opinions, with the most optimistic being highly supportive of decentralisation and public sector reform, to those who were highly critical, citing the presence of donors as a major source of corruption. The main weakness highlighted by Harris’ respondents was the incapacity of public sector staff. When he asked respondents how long they expected donors to stay in Sierra Leone, the answers were “10 years”, “20 years”, “a generation” and “forever”.
When describing successes, he made a very interesting point. Specific successes were due to key individuals who were able to drive through reform. He listed the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance as ‘success stories’ and in each case, there was a core group of people- maybe 5- who were able to mobilize the rest of their departments. These individuals were either Sierra Leoneans from the Diaspora or internationals seconded to the government. The president himself was described as a ‘lighthouse’- when he shines his light on a problem area, things improve but when his light moves on, there is only hope that reform will stay (beautiful imagery). One donor staff member described his role as ‘managing the lighthouse’.
This was very similar to the impression I formed in Sudan. Whenever there was reform or success, it was always due to key individuals, highly ambitious and highly competent, working very hard to make change. It is important to note that these were not all ex-pat Sudanese or foreigners- often they were Sudanese who were simply very determined. In most cases, however, it seems that these individuals would also have access to political capital- they were in some way, connected to the regime, if not directly, then through an intermediary.
Harris mentioned the ‘Drivers of Change’ research, funded by DfID in Liberia and other countries in 2003. This research has now been replicated across the world, including Sudan. One of its recommendations was to identify key individuals or groups- women, youth or other ‘drivers’- who should be targeted by external agents to make change. The only problem with this approach is that it is not always sustainable. When one individual leaves (or is removed), then progress falters. I can cite numerous examples of this phenomenon in Sudan. In particular, diaspora workers can often suffer from ‘burn-out’. Relocating oneself to a country struggling to develop is a lot to ask from young professionals who have grown accustomed operating in commercially or highly institutionalized environments overseas- especially when they have spent their entire education abroad as well.
In this way, I feel that, rather than focusing on diaspora workers, drivers of change must also include Sudanese from Sudan or Sierra Leoneans from Sierra Leone, who have more at stake in the success of reforms. They are there to stay! One member of the audience asked Harris about the relationship between the diaspora workers and the local staff- whether there was resentment about salaries or differences of opinion- this was a question Harris didn’t really have a good answer. I feel that this is a very important question and one that needs more research. From my own research on work environments in Sudan, there is often a lot of conflict between local and expat workers, and ESPECIALLY between expat Sudanese and local Sudanese. Some local Sudanese in international organisations like the UN or international businesses complained of a bias against them, because of their inability to communicate fluently in English. British and American educated Sudanese were often given more opportunities to speak in meetings and had more access to international staff. While these people are often key in moving reform, local drivers should not be overlooked. Lighthouses are all very well, but donors must also look into the darkness for partners and ‘drivers for change’.
Lastly, David Harris replied to my post and wanted to say that his my book will be coming out shortly with IB Tauris, called Civil War and Democracy in West Africa: Conflict Resolution, Elections and Justice in Sierra Leone and Liberia.
In the meantime, I wanted to share a few notes and comments about David Harris’ seminar last Wednesday on ‘Unfolding Consequences of Liberalism in Sierra Leone and Liberia: Liberal Justice and state-building at work” at the Centre of African Studies centre here in Edinburgh. Many of his points relate to developments in Sudan, so I thought I would briefly share.
His paper can be broken into two parts. The first was about formats of justice when dealing with post-conflict societies. He discussed the Sierra Leone Special Court (SLSC) in 2003. It has indicted 13 people, of whom: 3 have died, 1 has gone missing, 8 have been convicted and 1 is currently on trial (Charles Taylor). He believed that Sierra Leone was a special case, as the RUF had militarily collapsed and so the SLSC was able to operate in a political vacuum. He contrasted this situation with Liberia in 2003. Here, the rebels were still active and so it was impossible to hold trials. Those involved in war crimes were required for political bargaining. As part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (another CPA!), a Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) was established along with a two-year transitional government. As part of the agreement, no official operating in the transitional government could then run for government. Due to these stipulations, Harris believed that the election was an amazingly open civilian election.
Then Harris moved on to talk about trials more generally. He believed that 2000 was a kind of watershed. Before this time, there was a general acceptance of the necessity of political bargaining but after 2000, there was a shift towards criminal trials. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in 2006. Harris pointed out that, so far, every person indicted by the ICC has been an African (despite the evidence of war crimes in the Middle East by both Western and regional governments). Harris mentioned the political effects that these trials have had on the countries affected, in particular how the ICC has threatened peace prospects in Uganda and Sudan. In the case of Sudan, this point has been well documented in Mamdani’s controversial work, Survivors and Saviours and has been discussed and debated on Alex de Waal’s excellent blog, Making Sense of Sudan, especially in discussions about the Save Darfur movement and the ICC.
More generally, Harris discussed how there have been three shifts:
From bargaining to criminalisation
From the targeting of structures to individuals
The Delegitimization of violence.
Interestingly, on the last point, Harris wondered if this was something the international community really wanted to take on. He reminded us that the ANC in South Africa used violence as part of their struggle against the Apartheid regime. He asked: Is violence always unjustified? In some ways, events in Southern Sudan also question this trend, as SPLM used violence in order to break away from the North. It would be difficult to convince the Southern Sudanese that this violence was unjustified given the history between the North and South. Although many have pointed to the authoritarian and often violent nature of the SPLM leadership as a potential barrier to sustainable state-building in the new South Sudan.
There is a PhD student at the University of Khartoum who is doing research on the TRC in South Africa and its applicability to the Sudanese case. I look forward to her research, as I believe it is very important, but I also urge her to look at other cases besides South Africa. As Harris rightly points out that each case is different, depending on the status of the political and military parties involved. South Africa is largely seen as a success, but what about Sierra Leone and Liberia?
Harris questioned the idea that Liberal Justice has ever been successful when imposed from outside and asked whether other formats of justice are more appropriate. How do people see war crimes trial? Are people ambivalent about it? Do they want to open old wounds? Can TRCs deliver reconciliation even if they do not offer truth?
The second part of his seminar focused on state-building in Sierra Leone since 2003. Operating under a Post-Washington Consensus (that is, re-building the state in a neo-liberal framework) DfID, under the New Labour government, has been very active in the process, making a ten year promise to collaborate with the Sierra Leonean government. Harris presented his research on the perceived successes and failures from the point of view of the stakeholders involved. There were a number of interesting points, which reflect many similarities with the situation in Sudan.
First of all, Harris described a wide divergence of opinions, with the most optimistic being highly supportive of decentralisation and public sector reform, to those who were highly critical, citing the presence of donors as a major source of corruption. The main weakness highlighted by Harris’ respondents was the incapacity of public sector staff. When he asked respondents how long they expected donors to stay in Sierra Leone, the answers were “10 years”, “20 years”, “a generation” and “forever”.
When describing successes, he made a very interesting point. Specific successes were due to key individuals who were able to drive through reform. He listed the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance as ‘success stories’ and in each case, there was a core group of people- maybe 5- who were able to mobilize the rest of their departments. These individuals were either Sierra Leoneans from the Diaspora or internationals seconded to the government. The president himself was described as a ‘lighthouse’- when he shines his light on a problem area, things improve but when his light moves on, there is only hope that reform will stay (beautiful imagery). One donor staff member described his role as ‘managing the lighthouse’.
This was very similar to the impression I formed in Sudan. Whenever there was reform or success, it was always due to key individuals, highly ambitious and highly competent, working very hard to make change. It is important to note that these were not all ex-pat Sudanese or foreigners- often they were Sudanese who were simply very determined. In most cases, however, it seems that these individuals would also have access to political capital- they were in some way, connected to the regime, if not directly, then through an intermediary.
Harris mentioned the ‘Drivers of Change’ research, funded by DfID in Liberia and other countries in 2003. This research has now been replicated across the world, including Sudan. One of its recommendations was to identify key individuals or groups- women, youth or other ‘drivers’- who should be targeted by external agents to make change. The only problem with this approach is that it is not always sustainable. When one individual leaves (or is removed), then progress falters. I can cite numerous examples of this phenomenon in Sudan. In particular, diaspora workers can often suffer from ‘burn-out’. Relocating oneself to a country struggling to develop is a lot to ask from young professionals who have grown accustomed operating in commercially or highly institutionalized environments overseas- especially when they have spent their entire education abroad as well.
In this way, I feel that, rather than focusing on diaspora workers, drivers of change must also include Sudanese from Sudan or Sierra Leoneans from Sierra Leone, who have more at stake in the success of reforms. They are there to stay! One member of the audience asked Harris about the relationship between the diaspora workers and the local staff- whether there was resentment about salaries or differences of opinion- this was a question Harris didn’t really have a good answer. I feel that this is a very important question and one that needs more research. From my own research on work environments in Sudan, there is often a lot of conflict between local and expat workers, and ESPECIALLY between expat Sudanese and local Sudanese. Some local Sudanese in international organisations like the UN or international businesses complained of a bias against them, because of their inability to communicate fluently in English. British and American educated Sudanese were often given more opportunities to speak in meetings and had more access to international staff. While these people are often key in moving reform, local drivers should not be overlooked. Lighthouses are all very well, but donors must also look into the darkness for partners and ‘drivers for change’.
Lastly, David Harris replied to my post and wanted to say that his my book will be coming out shortly with IB Tauris, called Civil War and Democracy in West Africa: Conflict Resolution, Elections and Justice in Sierra Leone and Liberia.
Sunday, 8 August 2010
To the person who vandalised Dr. Siddiq Umbadda’s excellent paper on Education and Mismanagement of Sudanese Economy and Society (1954-1989)…
To the person who vandalised Dr. Siddiq Umbadda’s excellent paper on Education and Mismanagement of Sudanese Economy and Society (1954-1989), I have words for you!
You have terrible grammar.
I am reading this great (and quite poetically written) Development Studies and Research Centre paper (no. 83) from October 1990 and I’m starting to yell at the page. It’s not the information. It’s not the arguments, which are clever and making me re-consider how much wasta there was in the early days of Sudanese economic development (More generally, I am starting to re-think some of my arguments in light of all these old papers I have been reading this week). No, it is not Dr. Umbadda’s scholarship at all!
No, it’s all these annoying comments and ‘corrections’ that some young whippersnapper has felt the need to leave in his wake. What is most irritating is that most of his grammatical corrections are wrong! Now, I am NO grammar guru and I frequently roll over syntax rules with aplomb, but if you are going to go through a distinguished professor’s work and ‘correct’ his mistakes, have a little care… and if you are going to do so, don’t write ‘stupid’ in the margins when he is making a good point.
I don’t know you are, but HARAM on you!
As these papers are only available in paper form and only available after careful adventures in the University of Khartoum libraries, people should NOT feel the need to tamper with the texts!
OK, I obviously need to get out of the office and go home. Sunday grumpiness coming out.
One day, I will find you Development Studies and Research Centre vandal! One day!
You have terrible grammar.
I am reading this great (and quite poetically written) Development Studies and Research Centre paper (no. 83) from October 1990 and I’m starting to yell at the page. It’s not the information. It’s not the arguments, which are clever and making me re-consider how much wasta there was in the early days of Sudanese economic development (More generally, I am starting to re-think some of my arguments in light of all these old papers I have been reading this week). No, it is not Dr. Umbadda’s scholarship at all!
No, it’s all these annoying comments and ‘corrections’ that some young whippersnapper has felt the need to leave in his wake. What is most irritating is that most of his grammatical corrections are wrong! Now, I am NO grammar guru and I frequently roll over syntax rules with aplomb, but if you are going to go through a distinguished professor’s work and ‘correct’ his mistakes, have a little care… and if you are going to do so, don’t write ‘stupid’ in the margins when he is making a good point.
I don’t know you are, but HARAM on you!
As these papers are only available in paper form and only available after careful adventures in the University of Khartoum libraries, people should NOT feel the need to tamper with the texts!
OK, I obviously need to get out of the office and go home. Sunday grumpiness coming out.
One day, I will find you Development Studies and Research Centre vandal! One day!
Friday, 6 August 2010
Back to the... Future: Sudan in a 1990 Postscript
I was seven in 1989. I knew nothing of
This morning I have been re-reading Mansour Khalid’s book “The Government They Deserve” and the post-script is fascinating. Published in 1990, the author had just finished his book on the political elite of the country and had not expected what was to come: namely the coup of 1989 and the coming of the NIF. In Khalid’s postscript, you can really see the intense frustration with the ‘democratic’ government of Sadiq al Mahdi. People did not know what to expect from the Brigadier Bashir in those early days. Bearing in mind that Mansour Khalid was a bit of a political outsider and so his critique of Sadiq’s government is partly ideological and personal, it is nevertheless a fascinating look at the political climate at that time. Here is a (long) excerpt from the 1990 postscript:
“The future of the new government is as yet uncertain, but it will certainly have to face a number of grave problems. The coup has opened up as many questions as it supposedly answered. Foremost amongst there will be the transition back to civilian rule; an issue that was simply disregarded by the junta in their initial declarations. It is clearly not too soon to be thinking in these terms, if the lessons of the past have been learned at all, then it will have been noted by the new military regime that former Sudanese military and quasi-military governments have equally had their problems, and that engineering a satisfactory transfer of power to civil authorities has been a bugbear of all such governments. Those such as Abboud’s or Nimeiri’s, which hung on to power for too long, were eventually toppled overnight amidst popular jubilation.
What makes the present situation worse is the total administrative bankruptcy and the exhaustion of many of the institutions and organs of civil government. Worn out by corruption and disillusioned with the pathetic posturing of recent years, the people who might take the leading role in the future of civil governments, according to the new leader, had to persuaded to assume such responsibility. The 21-man strong civilian cabinet, announced on 9 Jule by General Bashir, reveals that the General was not persuasive enough. Trade Unionists and many senior civil servants who were approached to join the government refused, though a good number of them may have heaved a sigh of relief when Sadiq was removed. Incongruously while disillusionment with Sadiq’s government was universal, representatives of popular organizations continued to persuade themselves that the Sadiq-led democracy was there to stay as if all lewd and indecorous methods in which sectarian party politics were exercised were of no relevance to the way the governed judged their government.
To no-one’s surprise, therefore, the dissolution of parties and trade unions was the first step taken by the military. What follows, however, is harder to analyse. As like as not, the military may be tempted to cut corners and establish a one-party system notwithstanding the fiascos of similar top-down political organizations in the region including the Sudanese experience of the SSU. They, like some of their ilk, may also consider installing a so-called guided democracy or be wise enough to carefully prepare the ground for a return to genuine democracy in the light General Obasanjo and General Babangida in
Although it has little to do with Education, the current chapter of my thesis (which makes this diversion naughty), I found this postscript so interesting and helpful in understanding the 2010 election. In my discussions with voters, I was repeatedly told that Bashir is not as bad as what came before. I had always dismissed these sentiments, arguing that you cannot compare a three year term with a twenty year term. But maybe I am too hard on these voters. I was not around in the late eighties. Maybe the kind of frustration that Mansour Khalid writes about in this book were very strongly felt, maybe those memories cannot be dismissed offhand.
I believe the weight of history has clouded the way outsiders see this regime. We tend to imagine that the imprisonment of Turabi was a well recognized cover-up perceived by the Sudanese public at large and we perhaps romanticise the democratic period that preceded it, but re-reading literature from that period removes this weight of history. Things are a lot more complicated than we imagine, as we jump without the benefit of memories of our own. We have to take in account the late 80s if we want to understand the present period, and/or the future.
Saturday, 10 April 2010
The Paper Mill War: Elections Posters in Khartoum
Khartoum's streets are lined with the flickering faces of smiling men whose smiles have now been ripped and bruised. Before everyone pulled out, this election was being fought at the photocopiers. It was a visual fight, a papery race to the ballot. These are just some of the faces inhabiting the walls and streets of Khartoum this month...
The Sudanese Youth Federation implores you:
"to affirm your right and vote for a better tomorrow!"
The Umma Party Reform candidate Mubarark El Fadil El Mahdi. The Umma Party was the winner of the last national elections in 1986. This government was ousted in the military coup in 1989. The leader of the main Umma Party is still Sadiq al Mahdi. This is another faction, the Reform and Renewal's candidate, Mubarak El Fadil El Mahdi. The two factions unified about two weeks ago. They have now withdrawn from the presidency, though I believe they are still running in specific seats.
At the bottom, it reads:
"For a redefinition of the Sudanese state"
(it's a pity this bit of the poster is so tiny!)
The DUP party is the other historical party in Sudan. It is associated with the Al Mirghani family. Their leader is Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. I can't find any presidential posters but here are some posters for their Khartoum candidates. They pulled out of the elections but have now re-joined the process. There is a rumour that they were paid to do so (but this is just a rumour that no-one can prove. ;)
And here is Omar Bashir. The NCP party candidate and presiding head of state. The NCP has chosen a tree as its symbol. Its roots represent the rivers of Sudan. In the background, there is a photograph of Merowe Dam. This was built last year and inaugurated directly after the ICC indictment against Bashir.
Jousting for space along the road...
The Sudan People's Liberation Movement's candidate, Yassir Sayeed Arman. This party started as a liberation movement in Southern Sudan, led by John Garang. The NCP and the SPLM signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 . The election is part of this process, as is the referendum on Southern independence next year. Before he withdrew from the presidential race last week, he promised to "Activate the Participation of Women in Public Life"
The SPLM is now running in the South but not in the North.
The Sudanese Group for Democracy and Elections says
"Together, we can have free and fair elections!"
I wish I had had the good sense to take a photograph of this telegraph pole every day to document the change. Now the NCP has won the fight, but it has been a real paper mill battleground, with each party trying to claim it as their own. At the top, you can see some Umma posters, SPLM in the middle and independents at the bottom. Now it is Bashir land.
Democratic Union Party. National Council candidate,
Professor Mohamed Ali Aoud Karim.
His face is all over the place.
Here he is in a suit
and here he is in Jallabiya. Got to cover all sides!
Another NCP poster. Check out the visuals at the bottom. DEVELOPMENT! There was apparently some kind of ceremony at the Merowe dam this week, just in time for the elections!
(so why have we been having so many power cuts?)
A DUP poster erected in the last two days. There were none this size before last week. I wonder why...
Another NCP poster.
Mahjoub Mohamed Khaled
The Sudanese Communist Party.
They propose:
"Balanced development
Strong peace
One Nation
Entrenched democracy!"
Fatima Abd Al Mahmoud.
For President.
"For women and families
Democracy and Free Education and Health
Well-being and Rural Development for Sudan
Justice!"
She is the first female presidential candidate and she has chosen a pigeon as a symbol.
This is the presidential candidate for the Communist Party: Mohamed Ibrahim Naqd.
I like his hand gesture.
Another DUP poster.
An independent. He has chosen a football.
Galal Mohamed Salah Al Naqari. The PCP party (Turabi's party).
Turabi was part of the government in the early 1990's. He was pushed out and formed his own party, the PCP. They are still taking part in the election.
Here he is for the disabled and handicapped.
A huge Yassir Arman sign on the side of the road. The rumour is that they had to pay A LOT of money to the NCP for this privilege.
Women's alliance parties.
List of Women running for the National Council.
"For the sake of a better life for the Good People."
"There are many voters but one word: YES"
An independent for Khartoum state. He has chosen a bell as his symbol.
For the Khartoum State Assembly, Umma Party: Mohamed Akasha Ahmed Akasha
This photo comes from the rally after the ICC indictment.
It's only a little reassuring that they can't spell.
Another SPLM.
This time his poster reads "For peace, security and prosperity!"
Hope and Change? Inshallah....
What we should learn from this election.
"HEY HEY HEY!"
"Stop the car, there is a khawajia chasing us!"
"Why stop the car if she's after us? She looks mean!"
"Just stop the freaking car!"
The car stops.
Breathless, the words surface in my mouth, salty dry words that have been baked to a crisp by the chase.
"I.... want.... a.... poster."
"You want a poster?"
"Naam!"
"An Omar Bashir poster?"
Eyes roll up and down like extremely dubious yo-yos. Clearly I am not your typical NCP customer, but then who isn't these days? Even the mother of my Coptic landlady seems to love the cha cha man. "He good" she says to me, "strong!"
I try to get into character, "Yes, I want an Omar Bashir poster!" I forcibly silence the reason in my brain to spit out the words, "I have chased you down half of Africa Road, haven't I?"
"You like Bashir?" Narrowed faces almost poking at me. The reason's getting rowdy. Pipe down, I command! My eyes twitch. "A big time fan?"
"More or less", I concede, not explaining less is the operative word.
"Very well then."
They hand them over.
Alhamdulilah!
I have been collecting campaign posters from speeding vehicles, snapping inconspicuously at the road side and doing my damn well best to acquire political items of clothing- it began with a rather convincing Salva Kir hat, then an Umma waistcoast, now a beautiful SPLM t-shirt. But it's all a little sobering. I have done all of this for a non-election.
Last Sunday I went to the Rashid Diab arts centre to listen to a seminar about the elections. One of the speakers urged the foreign monitors to accept this election, unlike he said, Iran and Palestine. He got lots of cheers. A real crowd pleaser. But it's kind of hard to accept an election that none of the other parties accept (or didn't accept before they were bribed... but that is just a rumour!)
For those unfamiliar with Sudan's current election, it's important to think of it as a gift. A gift of legitimacy from the opposition parties to the ruling regime. He is clearly going to win the thing. He has all the state's resources to use at his disposal. He has twenty years of power under his belt, systematically destroying all opposition, kicking out and silencing intellectuals and monopolizing the media. He is also credited for bringing peace to the South, oil from the ground and stability to the country as a whole. Elections are in his interest. A gift. A democratic crown (probably made by Chinese workers)!
The gift is part of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the North and the South, and as such, it comes with strings. Some of these strings are public: when it comes to the election- an abrogation of the emergency laws, an independent election commission, limitations on campaign spending and widening of press freedoms. There are also lots of rumors about backroom dealing: hidden strings. It seems a little puzzling that the opposition parties waited until one week before the elections to announce their boycotts. You have to speculate that they have been negotiating with the ruling party: we will take part in this "show" if you meet our demands. Some say that the SPLM and the other parties had an agreement to cooperate with one another and when the SPLM pulled out (possibly by request from the NCP in return for a smooth referendum next year) the others withdrew angrily. Did the NCP manipulate the Juba Alliance in order to bring about this collapse? Did they underestimate the other parties' tenacity? The latest rumour is that the DUP has been paid millions of pounds to re-enter the election (certainly their posters have shot up dramatically these past couple days). Whether this offer was also extended to the Umma party, we can only speculate. Was the bribe not big enough? Did they resist on the basis of principles or do they have other tricks up their sleeves?
At first I was really angry at the other parties. Regimes aren't removed overnight. They take multiple elections. They take dilution. They take time. Whatever his image in the Western media, Omar Bashir is an extremely popular man- especially in Khartoum. And the other parties can't expect anything else. For me, this election was the first step of many. Of course the NCP was going to win, but the idea was to get people going.
From a Khartoum perspective, Sudan is booming. Roads are being built, parks and public spaces are being transformed, development projects have been jump-started all over the place over the past year (some say as a form of election campaign). And most importantly, people are scared of change. This is not surprising. Omar Bashir is all about stability. The last democratic period in Sudan was a time of great economic crisis, shortages in basic supplies, war and mass exodus of Sudanese professionals and experts abroad. Most of the people I have asked about the elections believe that Sadiq ElMahdi and his democracy failed to pull Sudan out of trouble. Whether it is fair to compare a three year term with a twenty year term is beside the point. Better the devil you know than the devil you don't.
What this election has really drummed into me is the idea that democracy does not begin and end with elections. Democracy is about a relationship between a state and its people. This is something Justin Willis spoke about in his lecture on the history of Sudanese elections last year. I wish the opposition parties had listened. For a real democracy to blossom, there has to be expectations. Demands! Promises extended and votes as contracts! Democracy is not supposed to be about loyalty, about charisma per se, but about interests, policies, development. This is not the situation in Sudan and has not been the case in past elections. Probably the most surprising thing about Omar Bashir's success is his popularity among those hardluck souls who don't have any wasta. The other week I met a taxi drivers with a PhD in Engineering who said he will still vote for Bashir. When I ask, "Why? You have a PhD and you're driving a taxi! Clearly not a good economy, not a good system!" He explained that he is better than the others. "They don't want change, they just want power." There are SO many people like this. Maybe they don't all have PhDs, but a vast number of the unemployed and semi-employed are university graduates who are dissatisfied with the labour market. If you can't convince these people to vote for you, then you aren't trying hard enough. It's really that simple.
This sentiment was echoed by a University of Khartoum professor, Atta El Battahani. He mused that perhaps the only party that really wants to change the system is the SPLM. The others just want to take over what the NCP has built. Many Northerners feel that the SPLM is a party of the South. After the referendum, they will be irrelevant and it would be foolish to squander your vote on a party that will soon be gone. When I went to the SPLM offices this week to interview someone about government employment, I was surprised about the number of Northerners in the office. It was kind of lovely: a snapshot of a new Sudan, Southerners and Northerners drinking tea together beneath a line of framed photographers of the late John Garang. Mash'allah! But without the philosopher-king, the SPLM doesn't seem to garner wide scale support in the North.
I have a lot of sympathy for the other parties. They are up against a mountain but at the same time, they could have done better. They could have made this election about issues, about the economy, about education, about jobs! There are so many frustrations simmering. They have really wasted an amazing opportunity to change the language of democracy away from loyalty and towards a discussion of the reality on the ground. There is so much opportunity in this country- oil, agriculture, universities galore and many of its problems (like the mismatch between education and employment) are due to terrible mismanagement, an amazing lack of coordination among government ministries and a complete lack of responsibility on the part of officials. I was completely stunned when the Minister of Labour told me it was not his responsibility to look at the career prospects of Sudanese graduates- that was the job of the Ministry of Higher Education. This government could be doing so much MUCH better- even leaving aside any discussion of Darfur. I have been saying all along that I don't really care which party wins, as long as they raise the expectations of the population, as long as they make government accountable. That is what democracy should bring: accountability. That is the whole bloody point, isn't it?
Instead it seems this election has brought the opposite: legitimacy without justification and we are all to blame. Obviously the NCP is to blame. They have manipulated the election and undermined the unity of the other parties. The other parties failed to change the language of democracy and make the "wasta-less" realize that change is possible. Of course they are scared, but people can be made to be brave! The international community is to blame for pushing and pushing without remembering the true purpose to begin with: to bring accountability. Those who understand Sudanese politics best- and I believe Atta and Justin are among them- have been recommending for this election to be postponed for months. It was clear that the country was not ready.
I hope that we all learn from this experience for next time and I do believe there will be a next time. Voter education should not just be about the mechanics of choosing, but about making demands and searching for solutions. A campaign should be a time of great discussion, a focus on national problems and a cacophony of suggestions. The international community is so obsessed with the mechanics of elections: the ballot papers, the finance, the posters, the journalists, the monitoring, but what about the issues? What about that relationship between people and candidate? How can we re-formulate interventions and programs that seek to promote democracy towards accountability? That is the lesson we should learn from this election, I believe.
I am still happy there will be an election. For one of my best friends here, this will be the first time he has ever participated in an election. It should be a time of celebration. In some ways, he is lucky. He wants to vote for an independent. He can still mark his "x" where he chooses. It is a fine thing to vote and we need to celebrate!
We shall see what the week ahead brings. What kind of celebrations are in order.
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